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CASES

NOTED

CUSTOMARY USE OF FLORIDA BEACHES
Petitioner, McMillan and Wright, Inc., applied for and received a
building permit from co-petitioner, City of Daytona Beach, authorizing the construction of an observation tower. The tower was to be
located on a beach south of and adjacent to an existing pier owned by
McMillian and Wright, Inc. It was to be operated as a part of the
pier's recreation facilities. After test borings and other arrangements
had been made, but before construction of the tower had commenced,
the respondent Tona-Rama, Inc., a rival tower owner, instituted an
action for declaratory judgment as to ownership of the land and for
injunctive relief restraining McMillan and Wright, Inc. from acting in
furtherance of the construction plans.' Application for temporary injunction was denied and the tower was completed during pendency of
the litigation. Summary judgment in favor of respondents was granted
by the trial court which found that the public had acquired a prescriptive right to use the land as a bathing beach, thoroughfare, recreation
area and playground. 2 McMillan and Wright, Inc. was directed to
remove the tower and to restore the land to its natural condition
within ninety days. The District Court of Appeal, First District,
affirmed the judgment of the trial court and certified the case to the
Supreme Court of Florida as one involving a question of great public
interest under the Florida Constitution. 3 The Supreme Court of
Florida held, quashed and remanded: Where public use of a private
beach is reasonable and has continued for many years without dispute
or interruption, the public may gain the right to continue to use the
beach through custom. Under such limitation, a land owner may
make such use of the property as is not inconsistent with the public's
right. City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73 (Fla.
1974).
The question of the public's right to use privately owned beaches
for recreation had not been considered by the Supreme Court of
Florida for almost thirty years. 4 While recognizing that a recreational
easement could in theory be acquired through adverse public use,
earlier decisions had held uniformly against the existence of such an
easement. 5 In Miami Beach v. Miami Beach Improvement Co. 6 and
1. The interest of both the State of Florida, intervenor in the suit, and the Florida Board of
Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund, co-respondent, were represented by the Attorney

General's office.
2. Use of the beach in question by the public had been so extensive that the city had policed
the area to preserve order and had also provided sanitation, lifeguards and other services,
Although the city had collected taxes on the property from McMillan and Wright, Inc., the record
title holder for sixty-five years, respondents argued that due to the long continued public use, the
land had become a public highway and beach, and that no lawful authority for the tower's
construction could have emanated from the City of Daytona Beach.
3. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3).
4. Miami Beach v. Undercliff Realty & Inv. Co., 21 So. 2d 783 '(Fla. 1945).
5. Id.; Miami Beach v. Miami Beach Imp. Co., 14 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1943).
6. 14 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1943).
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Miami Beach v. Undercliff Realty & Investment Co., 7 the public's

right to continue to use the beach was claimed on the bases of prescription and implied dedication. Both theories require that the public use
be adverse.8 Because the element of adverseness was absent in these
two cases, the claims failed.
In Undercliff, the court explained that the upland owner's failure
to prevent or object to the use of his beach by many persons for
recreation, did not prove that the use was adverse or under claim of
right. 9 The judicial attitude toward the public's claim of the right to
use private beaches can be ascertained from the holding in Undercliff;
the court dismissed the claim with prejudice and perpetually enjoined
the public from using or claiming to be entitled to use the beach in
question.
In Downing v. Bird, '0 the Supreme Court of Florida stated that
acquisition of rights in the property of another based on possession or
use was to be restricted, and doubts as to the creation of such rights
Were to be resolved in favor of the owner. "I Speaking of prescription
in particular, the Downing court said: "[T]he burden is on the claimant
to prove that the use . . . is adverse. This essential element as well as

all others must be proved by clear and positive proof, and cannot be
established by loose,
uncertain testimony which necessitates resort to
12
mere conjecture.'

In other states, however, the level of proof necessary to establish a
prescriptive right or public dedication has been lowered in those cases
involving privately owned beaches. In Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 13
the Supreme Court of California held that if the land in question is a
beach or shoreline, claimants need only show that the land was used as
a public recreation area and that persons had used the property in the
belief that the public had a right to such use. No separate finding of
adverseness is needed where it is found that the public used the land in
this manner for longer than the prescriptive period. 14
Under certain circumstances, courts have found the required adversenes even though the land owner had granted permission to some
members of the public to use the beach. A Texas court stated in
Seaway Co. v. Attorney General: "If the nature of the use is such as to
show the owner that the users are claiming under a right independent
7. 21 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1945) [hereinafter referred to as Undercliff].

8. J.C. Vereen & Sons, Inc. v. Houser, 123 Fla. 641, 167 So. 45 (1936); 23 AM. JUR. 2d
Dedication § 29 (1955); 10 FLA. JUR. Dedication § 13 (1956).
9. 21 So. 2d at 786 (Fla. 1945).
10. 100 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 1958) [hereinafter referred to as Downing].
11. Id.at 65.
12. Id.at 64.
13. 84 Cal. Rptr. 162, 465 P.2d 50 (1950).
14. The prescriptive period in California is five years. CALIF. CODE OF CIV. PRO. § 325
(West 1967). In Florida, the period necessary for prescription remains set at the more traditional
twenty years. J.C. Vereen & Sons, Inc. v. Houser, 123 Fla. 641, 167 So. 2d 45 (1936).
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of any permission from him, there is the requisite adverseness."'"
Similarly, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire found a public right
to use a church-owned beach that had been used both by persons with,
and persons without, permission.' 6 The use by the public was said to
have been such that the owners knew or should have known that the
public was acting under a claim of right without regard to the owners'
consent.
In Tona-Rama, witnesses attested to a degree of public use which
in California, Texas or New Hampshire might have supported respon17
dents' claim that a prescriptive easement had been acquired.
Nevertheless, the strong precedent of Undercliff and Downing with
regard to the necessary proof as to the existence of a prescriptive
easement was not overcome. For most of the Florida decisions dealing
with claims against another's property based on use, strict standards
for proof of adverseness have been maintained.
The Tona-Rama decision cites Downing as support for identifying
the elements of prescription. There must be both a specified period of
actual, continuous, and uninterrupted use that is adverse under claim
of right, and actual or imputed knowledge on the part of the owner of
both the use and adverse claim. 18 " '[T]he use . . . must be inconsistent
with the owner's use and enjoyment of his lands and must not be a
permissive use, for the use must be such that the owner has a right to a
legal action to stop it, such as an action for trespass or ejectment.'. "19
According to Downing, there is a presumption that the use of the
alleged prescriptive easement has been permissive, although, this presumption can be rebutted by the claimant. 20 However, for its own
statement of the presumption, the Tona-Rama court refers to the much
earlier case of J. C. Vereen and Sons v. Houser2 1 which speaks of an
irrebuttable presumption. Both Vereen and Tona-Rama state that the
use must be exclusive and inconsistent with the owner's right to use
and enjoyment of the land, or the use will be presumed permissive
and, therefore, will never ripen into an easement. 22 The Tona-Rama
court reasoned that since the corporation operated the pier as a recreation center and tourist attraction, it welcomed the presence of those
who used the surrounding beach. Because the public's use was in
15. Seaway Co. v. Attorney General, 375 S.W.2d 923, 938 (Texas Civ. App. 1964).
16. Elmers v. Rogers, 106 N.H. 512, 214 A.2d 750 (1965).
17. As per the attorney general's brief at 8 and 9, one resident of Daytona Beach testified
that the authority by which he had used the beach was "as a citizen and being public property."
R. 348. Another said that he "definitely" felt he had a "right to use the beach;" that "it was the
customary thing to do;" and that "everyone did." R. 321. Similar testimony was given by other
witnesses.
18. 294 So. 2d at 76, quoting Downing v. Bird, 100 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 1958).
19. Id. (emphasis added by citing court).
20. Id.
21. J.C. Vereen & Sons, Inc. v. Houser, 123 Fla. 641, 167 So. 45 (1936).
22. Id. at 645, 167 So. at 47; 294 So. 2d at 76.
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furtherance of, and not against the
interest of the owner, no easement
23
by prescription could be gained.
Although no prescriptive easement was found to exist, the public's
right to recreational use of the beach was not left unprotected. The
court applied the doctrine of "custom" which may be used to confirm
the public's right without the necessity of proving adverse use. The
customary right found by the Tona-Rama court was based on ancient
and reasonable use of the beach which had continued without interruption and dispute. Although the Supreme Court of Florida had
24
previously used the doctrine of custom to determine property rights,
it had never before used it to establish public rights in private property.
Whether the public right is a prescriptive or a customary one, the
owner may make any use of the property which is consistent with the
public's use and not calculated to interfere with it. In this case, the
court believed that the construction of the sky tower was consistent
with general recreational use by the public. The fact that the tower's
base covers approximately only 225 to 230 of the 15,300 square feet to
which McMillan and Wright, Inc. held record title was emphasized, as
was the investment of over $125,000 in the tower's construction. Thus,
25
the tower was allowed to stand.
From the facts presented, the court could reasonably have concluded that the public's prior use of the beach for recreation had not
been inconsistent with the owner's use and enjoyment of the property.
Based on Downing, this would have been sufficient to defeat the claim
of a prescriptive easement. It seems curious, therefore, that the court
referred to Vereen and raised the additional requirement that the
adverse use must also be exclusive. In Downing, the Supreme Court of
Florida had specifically negated any such requirement. The court
distinguished prescription from adverse possession by saying: "[T]o
acquire title the possession must be exclusive, while with a prescriptive
'26
right the use may be in common with the owner, or the public.
Further evidence of either judicial confusion or an overturning,
sub silentio, of Downing's distinctions between prescription and adverse possession can be found in this case. The Tona-Rama opinion
states: "[N]either the trial court, nor the District Court, reached the
other requirement for prescription to be properly effective-adverse
possession inconsistent with the owner's use and enjoyment of the
land."'2 7 This clearly conflicts with the same court's statement in
Downing. "In acquiring title by adverse possession, there must of
course be 'possession.' In acquiring a prescriptive right this element is
23.
24.
25,
26.
27.

294 So. 2d at 77-78.
Loeffler v. Roe, 69 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1953).
294 So. 2d at 73.
Downing v. Bird, 100 So. 2d 57, 65 (Fla. 1958).
294 So. 2d at 77 (emphasis added).

CASES NOTED

19741

use of the privilege without actual possession."28 To require that a
claimant to a prescriptive easement establish exclusive adverse possession, rather than non-exclusive adverse use of the property in which
the easement is claimed is a new and startling development.
In considering the impact of Daytona v. Tona-Rama, two distinctions between prescription and custom must be examined. Of primary
importance is the nature of the use required for each. Consent of the
owner to the use, which would destroy the adverseness necessary to
establish prescription, is not similarly effective to defeat a right based
on custom. With the application of custom to claims of a public
easement in private ocean-front property, beach owners have lost as a
defense the fact that they had granted permission for past public use.
A second significant difference between prescription and custom is
the required duration of the use involved. The requirement for prescription is use for exactly twenty years. 29 For custom, the test is
imprecise-ancient use continuing from time immemorial. 30 The issues of what duration of public use will be considered ancient and
what range of uses will be considered consistent with a public easement must still be resolved. The answers may be given soon as
pressures from a growing population with competing demands on the
beaches increase the frequency of these cases.
PATRICIA IRELAND

NO REQUIREMENT TO PROVIDE COUNSEL FOR
INDIGENTS ON DISCRETIONARY APPEALS
Respondent Moffitt, an indigent represented by court-appointed
counsel, was convicted twice of forgery in two North Carolina counties. Both convictions were affirmed on first appeals of right to the
North Carolina Court of Appeals.' In one case the State refused to
provide counsel for the discretionary appeal to the state supreme court;
in the other, respondent was represented by a public defender and the
Supreme Court of North Carolina denied certiorari. 2 Respondent
28. Downing v. Bird, 100 So. 2d 57, 65 (Fla. 1958) (emphasis added).
29. J.C. Vereen & Sons, Inc. v. Houser, 123 Fla. 641, 167 So. 45 (1936).
30. 1 W. BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES 75-78. In State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Ore.

584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969), the public use of the beach was admitted to have continued for more
than sixty years. The court's opinion traced the use of the dry sand areas from the aboriginal
inhabitants through the first European settlers to the present day residents. Testimony cited in
the Attorney General's brief established public use of the beach for at least fifty-two years.
1. State v. Moffitt, 9 N.C. App. 694, 177 S.E.2d 324 (1970) (this was the conviction in
Mecklenburg County); State v. Moffitt, 11 N.C. App. 337, 181 S.E.2d 184 (1971) (this was the

conviction from Guilford County).
2. State v. Moffitt, 279 N.C. 396, 183 S.E.2d 247 (1971).

